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(57) ABSTRACT 
A method and apparatus utilizes Layered IPSEC (LES) pro-
tocol as an alternative to IPSEC for network-layer security 
including a modification to the Internet Key Exchange pro-
tocol. For application-level security of web browsing with 
acceptable end-to-end delay, the Dual-mode SSL protocol 
(DSSL) is used instead of SSL. The LES and DSSL protocols 
achieve desired end-to-end communication security while 
allowing the TCP and HTTP proxy servers to function cor- 
rectly. 
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METHOD OF PERFORMANCE-AWARE 
SECURITY OF UNICAST COMMUNICATION 
IN HYBRID SATELLITE NETWORKS 
CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
This application claims the benefit of Application Ser. No. 
61/324,631 filed on Apr. 15, 2010 which is incorporated 
herein by reference in its entirety. 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
The subject matter disclosed herein was made with gov-
ernment funding and support under NCC8235 awarded by 
NASA. The government has certain rights in this invention. 
FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY 
only to the end points. Therefore a TCP PEP, which is an 
intermediate node in the communication path, cannot read or 
modify the TCP header, since the PEP does not know the 
keys. Consequently the PEP cannot function, leading to a 
5 degradation in the performance of the TCP protocol. 
The Secure Socket Layer (SSL), on the other hand, oper-
ates above the transport layer in the protocol stack and estab-
lishes a secure HTTP (HTTPS) session on a need basis. SSL 
encrypts the TCP payload (the application layer HTTP data) 
between the client and the server, but the TCP header is 
10 transmitted in the clear. Therefore the TCP PEPS can function 
correctly with SSL. However, the HTML webpage encrypted 
into SSL records are readable only by the client and the server 
who have the decryption keys. The keys are not available to 
the HTTP proxy, and therefore the HTTP proxy cannot read 
15 the HTML webpage. Consequently, HTML object pre-fetch-
ing by the hub proxy server cannot take place. The net result 
is that a web page with n—I embedded obj ects takes n*RTT to 
get loaded, an increase in delay by a factor of n. 
The exemplary implementations described herein relate to 20 	 SUMMARY 
methods for securing end-to-end communication in hybrid 
satellite networks. 	 The exemplary implementation d escribed herein provide 
solutions that allow IPSEC and SSL to work in conjunction 
with TCP and HTTP proxy servers in hybrid satellite net- 
25 works, so that the unicast communication is secured without 
sacrificing the performance optimization algorithms. These 
solutions were obtainedby considering prospective candidate 
protocols and evaluating their performance through simula-
tions. 
30 The Layered IPSEC protocol is proposed to be used as an 
alternative to IPSEC and also proposed are modifications to 
the Internet Key Exchange protocol that is used by IPSEC for 
dynamic session establishment. The Dual-Mode SSL proto-
col is proposed as an alternative to SSL. Performance analysis 
35 of the proposed protocols are provided below together with 
optimized versions of the Dual-mode SSL. 
BACKGROUND 
Satellite links suffer from longer propagation delays com-
pared to terrestrial links The delay can be as high as 500 ms 
round-trip for a geostationary satellite link. Most Internet 
traffic uses the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which 
is highly susceptible to the delay-bandwidth product and 
exhibits very poor performance in satellite channels. 
To mitigate the negative effects of the satellite propagation 
delay on Internet traffic, commercial satellite networks usu-
ally implement a split-connection TCP Performance Enhanc-
ing Proxy (PEP). A PEP agent is installed at the satellite 
gateway between the satellite network and the Internet. The 
PEP agent inspects every TCP packet that flows through the 
network and sends back premature acknowledgments to the 
TCP senders. Studies have shown that this technique leads to 
significant performance improvement in satellite networks. 
Commercial satellite networks also employ HTTP proxy 
servers, at the central hub and each client location, to improve 
the speed of response to web browsing requests for Internet 
traffic. When the remote client makes a request for a webpage, 
the web server responds with the requested base HTML page. 
The hub HTTP proxy server intercepts and reads the web 
page and sends multiple GET requests to the destination web 
server to retrieve all the embedded objects in the base page. 
This exchange occurs over a high-speed terrestrial connection 
between the hub and the Internet, thereby saving the time each 
request would have needed for a round trip over the satellite 
link. As the objects are retrieved by the hub, they are imme-
diately forwarded to the client proxy. The client browser GET 
requests are terminated at the local proxy server, which for-
wards the pre-fetched documents to the client browser imme-
diately. The net result is that only a single GET request from 
the user browser traverses the satellite link, while a set of 
rapid responses quickly deliver the requested webpage and 
associated elements to the browser. 
Two protocols that are widely used for secure unicast com-
munication are the Internet Security Protocol (IPSEC) and 
the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. 
IPSEC creates an end-to-end secure channel at the network 
layer for the secure transfer of traffic between two end users. 
The problem with using IPSEC in satellite networks is that it 65 
disables the functionality of the PEPS. The IP packet payload, 
which includes the TCP header, is encrypted with keys known 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
For network layer encryption and integrity protection, it 
was determined to use the Layered IPSEC Security protocol 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
40 	 These and further aspects of the exemplary illustrative 
non-limiting implementations will be better understood in 
light of the following detailed description of illustrative 
exemplary non-limiting implementations in conjunction with 
the drawings, of which: 
45 	 FIG. lA depicts packet format for original IPSEC ESP 
tunnel mode encryption; 
FIG. 1B depicts packet format for Layered IPSEC ESP 
tunnel mode encryption; 
FIG. 2 illustrates a modification of IKE phase 2; 
50 FIG. 3 illustrates the use of Dual Mode SSL for HTTP 
optimization; 
FIG. 4 shows a comparison of the application response 
time for LES and IPSEC; 
FIG. 5 shows a comparison between the average TCP load 
55 due to LES with IKE and other cases; 
FIG. 6 shows a comparison of the response times for com-
pleting the DSSL handshake against the SSL handshake; 
FIG. 7 shows a comparison of the response times for vari-
ous DSSL handshake versions; and 
60 	 FIG. 8 shows a comparison of the application response 
times for multiple secure browsing sections with multiple 
servers. 
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4 
(LES), which is based on the concept of breaking the IPSEC 	 a set of six keys the four keys for forward and reverse 
encryption in multiple encryption regions or zones on a single 	 encryption and authentication between the client and server, 
packet basis. The method has been proposed independently 	 and two additional keys to be used by the sender to perform 
for enhancing TCP performance and security in wireless net- 	 layered encryption on the IP header and also layered authen- 
works. Known as multilayer IPSEC or ML-IPSEC, and Lay-  5 tication. The exemplary implementations add a fourth mes- 
ered IPSEC (LES), the idea is to encrypt different regions of 	 sage dissemination to IKE phase 2, in which the client dis- 
the IP packet using different keys as shown in FIG. 1B. The 	 tributes the two additional keys to the local and remote proxy 
TCP payload is encrypted with key Kl which is shared only 	 servers. The client encrypts the IP header encryption keys 
between the endpoints. The original IP header and the TCP 	 using the public keys of the proxy servers (it is assumed that 
header are encrypted with key K2 which is shared by the io the public keys and certificates of the proxy servers are avail- 
endpoints with intermediate authorized nodes like the TCP 	 able to the client), authenticates the message using a digital 
PEP. Therefore a TCP PEP can decrypt the header portion of 	 signature, and sends the authenticated message to the proxy 
the ESP packet with K2 and read the TCP header to do its 	 servers. FIG. 2 illustrates the step added to IKE phase 2 for 
performance optimizations. But the PEP cannot read the TCP 
	
key management for LES. 
payload and therefore cannot access the actual data since it 15 	 Additionally, the exemplary implementations use only the 
does not posses the key Kl. 	 aggressive mode of IKE phase 1 exchange, and the quick 
The correctness of operation of LES has been established 	 mode of IKE phase 2 exchange. This is to contain the negative 
in the prior art in that its performance is comparable to IPSEC 	 effect of the long round-trip delay on the overall perfor- 
for the specific cryptographic algorithms used. The prior art 	 mance-4o ensure that the delay incurred due to the IKE 
has also established that the throughput overhead of ML-  20 message exchanges do not neutralize the advantages that 
IPSEC in a simple test-bed is 2%-7% compared to IPSEC. 	 might be gained due to the use of LES. The IKE phase 1 
It was postulated that the LES approach would be an effec- 	 aggressive mode will reduce the delay by 50%, compared to 
tive security solution in hybrid satellite networks that would 	 the IKE phase 1 main mode. As will be described below, 
allow TCP PEPS to function effectively. However, LES intro- 	 whether that is sufficient savings is evaluated through simu- 
duces higher complexity and higher communication over-  25 lations. 
head compared to IPSEC in the establishment of the secure 	 When the HTTP traffic is secured using SSL and the secu- 
channel that now requires co-ordination not only between the 	 rity policy does not allow for trusted third parties, the use of 
end points, but also with the proxy servers. Therefore an 	 a modified SSL protocol, the Dual-Mode SSL (DSSL) pro- 
investigation was carried out regarding the performance of 	 tocol is proposed. As shown in FIG. 3, the secure connection 
end-to-end traffic when LES is implemented in conjunction 30 in DSSL has two modes an end-to-end main mode connec- 
with TCP PEP optimizations in a hybrid satellite network, 	 tion between the client and the web server, and a secondary 
and compared to the case where IPSEC is implemented (and 	 mode connection that has the hub HTTP proxy as an inter- 
therefore the TCP PEPS cannot function). 	 mediate node. The security parameters for both modes are 
The prior art assumed pre-shared keys between the end 	 negotiated between the client and the server. Since DSSL 
points and the TCP PEP to establish the secure channel. 35 extends the SSL protocol to include support for HTTP proxy 
However, in situations when the IPSEC encryption keys are 	 servers, the message structures and many of the protocol steps 
dynamically determined at the time of establishing the secure 	 are similar. DSSL introduces a series of additional message 
channel, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is used to generate 	 exchanges between the client and the HTTP proxy server, and 
the keys. IKE performs a series of handshakes between the 	 between the proxy server and the web server. The various 
end points to establish the two keys used by IPSEC for 40 stages of the DSSL protocol are described below. 
encryption/decryption and two keys for authentication (the 	 Stage 1: Client-Proxy Handshake Phase 1. 
usage of the keys in IPSEC is uni-directional). 	 When a remote client wants to establish a secure session for 
IKE operates in two phases phase 1 and phase 2. The 	 the very first time, it might not be aware of the security 
phase 1 exchange happens once and it creates a security 	 parameters of the HTTP proxy. It therefore establishes a 
association that allows multiple phase 2 connections to be set 45 connection to the HTTP proxy and initiates the first stage of 
up between the client and the server. The phase 1 exchange 	 the DSSL protocol, the client-proxy handshake phase 1. In 
can happen in either the main mode, in which there are 3 pairs 	 this phase the client sends its security certificate to the HTTP 
of message exchanges between the end points, or in the 	 proxy, which in turn responds with its own security certifi- 
aggressive mode, in which all the exchanges are condensed 	 cate. The client thus obtains the public key of the HTTP proxy 
into a total of 3 messages. 	 50 server from the proxy's certificate. The start and end of the 
In IKE phase 2 quick mode, there is a total of 3 exchanges 	 communication in each phase is marked by a "Hello" and a 
between the initiator and the responder peers, during which 
	
"Done" message respectively, for each of the participating 
the two parties verify the keying material that eachwill use for 	 entities. This is in accordance with the original SSL protocol. 
the session. The phase 2 exchange uses the session keys 	 Stage 2: Client-Server Handshake. 
established in phase 1 to do mutual authentication and estab-  55 	 Once the client has obtained the security certificate of the 
lish a phase 2 session key. Based on the phase 2 session key, 	 HTTP proxy, it contacts the web server to exchange security 
the two end points agree on a set of four keys used by IPSEC. 	 credentials and to establish the session keys for the secure 
in the exemplary implementations the IKE protocol was 	 web session. This stage is similar to the SSL protocol, with 
modified to incorporate the generation of additional keys 	 two exceptions (i) the client sends both its own certificate 
needed for LES. In the modified protocol, in IKE phase 1 the 6o and the HTTP proxy certificate to the web server, and (ii) in 
initiator entity (which would be the remote client node in the 	 the key exchange step, the client generates both primary and 
present scenario) includes the certificates of the remote and 	 secondary keys and sends them to the web server. 
hub proxy nodes in the protection mechanism negotiation 	 Stage 3: Client-Proxy Handshake Phase 2. 
stage with the responder entity (the server node in in the 	 After the client and the web server have established the 
present scenario). The keying data that is exchanged between 65 session keys in the second stage, the client again contacts the 
the end points in the modified IKE phase 1 is subsequently 	 HTTP proxy and instructs it to obtain the session keys from 
used in IKE phase 2, so that the client and the server agree on 	 the web server. 
US 8,671,273 B2 
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Stage 4: Proxy-Web Server Handshake. 
The HTTP proxy contacts the web server and sends its 
certificate to authenticate itself. Upon correct authentication, 
the web server sends the secondary session key to the HTTP 
proxy. 5 
Stage 5: Client-Proxy Handshake Phase 3. 
This final stage of the key establishment protocol is essen-
tially a continuation of the client-proxy handshake phase 2. 
After the proxy obtains the secondary key from the web 
server, it contacts the client to confirm that it has received the i0 
key. The establishment of the primary and secondary keys 
between the client, the web server and the proxy is now 
complete. 
All the message exchanges in DSSL are authenticated 15 
using digital certificates. 
Let Kl be the encryption key for the main mode, and K2 be 
the encryption key for the secondary mode. When the client 
makes an HTTPS request, the client proxy sends local replies 
to the client browser. The web server, on receiving the 20 
request, parses the requested HTML page to obtain the 
embedded object links, which are collated into a new HTML 
page. The object links HTML page is then encrypted by 
DSSL using K2 to create the proxy SSL record. DSSL 
encrypts the base HTML page using Kl to create the primary 25 
SSL record. The two records are appended together and sent 
to the client in an IP packet (FIG. 3). The hub proxy intercepts 
the IP packet, extracts the object links from the proxy SSL 
record using K2, and pre-fetches the embedded objects. The 
web server always encrypts the actual objects using Kl, so 30 
that the hub proxy cannot read the base HTML page data. The 
hub proxy transfers the embedded objects to the client 
together at one time. Thus the HTTP proxy functionality is 
preserved in DSSL while maintaining end-to-end security of 35 
the HTML page contents. 
The performance of Layered IPSEC with IKE modifica-
tions have been analyzed through simulations in OPNET 
Modeler. The simulation setup consisted of a remote client 
connected to a server via a satellite link. All communication 40 
between the client and the server passed through the remote 
and satellite hub TCP PEPS. The satellite link delay was 130 
milli-seconds, uplink bandwidthwas 256 kbps andthe down-
link bandwidth was 70 Mbps. 
FIG. 4 shows that the application response time for LES is 45 
significantly better than that of IPSEC, both when IKE and 
pre-shared keys are used. (In all the graphs, X-axis is the 
simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the application response 
time in seconds.) This is because when IPSEC is used, the 
TCP optimizations are not working and therefore TCP con- 50 
siders the channel error to be signs of congestion and thus 
goes into recovery mode quicker. The graphs also indicate 
that using IKE adds significantly higher delay compared to 
using pre-shared keys. This is due to the multiple message 
exchanges between the client, the server and the PEPS that are 55 
needed by IKE to establish the secure channel. Each message 
exchange goes over the satellite links and adds to the overall 
delay. In fact, the delay for LES with pre-shared keys is nearly 
as low as that of unsecured data transmission with full TCP 
optimization, which has the lowest delay. The slightly higher 60 
delay for the former is primarily due to the IPSEC processing 
overhead at the nodes, and the slight transmission overhead 
due to the larger packet sizes due to LES headers and trailers. 
The effect of TCP optimizations is so pronounced that the 
lack of optimizations can have a greater effect on the overall 65 
delay than the IKE overhead. This is illustrated by the delay 
graph of IPSEC with pre-shared keys, which starts out much  
6 
lower compared to LES with IKE (as can be expected), but it 
climbs higher when the un-optimized TCP in the former case 
runs into channel errors. 
FIG. 5 shows that the average TCP load due to LES with 
IKE is much higher than the other cases. At simulation time I 
hour 40 minutes, the LES TCP load is 89.938562 bps, which 
is 42% higher than the TCP load for unsecured transmission 
(63.333333 bps), and 37.7% higher that IPSEC with IKE 
(65.318627 bps). However, this high overhead is mostly due 
to IKE. In the case of LES with pre-shared keys, the TCP load 
is 66.686275 bps at simulation time I hour 40 minutes. This 
is only 1.1% higher than IPSEC with pre-shared keys 
(65.941176 bps), and 5.3% higher than unsecured transmis-
sion. 
The results indicate that Layered IPSEC can be a viable 
alternative to IPSEC for satellite networks, with comparable 
byte overhead while providing significant improvement in 
application performance. However, this holds true only if the 
secure channel is established apriori. While using IKE will 
still result in improved application response times for high 
channel error conditions, it might introduce unacceptably 
high overhead even with the proposed modifications. 
The performance of the DSSL protocol and associated web 
browsing was analyzed by OPNET simulations. The setup 
was similar to that described above, with the difference being 
that HTTP proxy servers are used in place of the TCP PEP 
servers. We conducted simulations for different scenarios 
(i) unsecured web browsing with functional HTTP proxy, (ii) 
SSL security and hence non-operational HTTP proxy and (iii) 
DSSL security with HTTP proxy functional. 
FIG. 6 compares the response times for completing the 
DSSL handshake against the SSL handshake. The graph 
highlights the delay overhead of DSSL due to the additional 
steps of the client communicating with the proxy server in 
DSSL stages 1, 3 and 5, and the proxy server contacting the 
web server in stage 4. The DSSL overhead ranges between 
20.3% and 20.74% over the SSL handshake delay. 
To reduce the high delay involved in DSSL handshake, it 
was proposed to use a condensed version of DSSL, in which 
the handshake consists of only the first two stages. In the first 
stage, the client contacts the HTTP proxy and exchanges each 
other's digital certificate. Subsequently, the client contacts 
the web server. Once the client and the web server have 
established the security parameters in stage 2 of DSSL, the 
client makes the first HTTP GET request. This request goes 
through the HTTP proxy and triggers the proxy to send its 
certificate to the web server, and a request for the DSSL 
session secondary keys. The HTTP proxy request is piggy-
backed on the client HTTP GET request. The server responds 
to the client request with the base webpage in a HTTP POST 
response. In addition, the server responds to the proxy key 
request with its own certificate and the DSSL secondary 
session keys, encrypted with the proxy's public key. This 
response to the proxy is piggy-backed on the HTTP response 
to the client. The proxy receives the combined response from 
the web server and is thus able to retrieve the secondary 
session keys from the encrypted message, using its private 
key. Consequently, it is able to decrypt the relevant portions of 
the HTTP POST response and therefore can perform the 
HTTP acceleration. We refer to this variant of DSSL as DSSL 
two-phase. 
The first stage in DSSL two-phase is necessary in the 
situation that the client and the HTTP proxy server do not 
share any security association beforehand. However, if the 
two entities are apriori aware of each other's security infor-
mation (via their digital certificates), then this phase is not 
needed. Every time the client contacts a web server to initiate 
US 8,671,273 B2 
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a secure web session, it passes to the web server a locally 	 requirements in the described exemplary implementations 
cached copy of the HTTP proxy's certificate. The DSSL 	 that approach would be unacceptable. 
protocol can thus be further reduced to just one stage, that of 	 The adverse effects of IPSEC and SSL on unicast commu- 
stage 2. The DSSL secondary session key is transmitted to the 	 nication in satellite networks are solved by the use of layered 
HTTP proxy piggybacked on the first response from the 5 IPSEC with modified IKE for securing unicast communica- 
server, as described in the DSSL two-phase. We refer to this 	 tion while allowing performance optimization algorithms to 
optimization of the DSSL protocol as DSSL quick mode. 	 function simultaneously. Also proposed is the use of the 
FIG. 7 compares the response times of DSSL handshake 	 DSSL protocol with three variations, to replace SSL for 
for its various versions. At simulation time 1 hour and 20 	 secure HTTP in hybrid satellite networks. Simulations have 
minutes, DSSL quick mode handshake time is 33% less than io shown that the performance of the proposed protocols com- 
DSSL two-phase (11.5 seconds and 17.2 seconds, respec- 	 pare favorably to standard IPSEC and SSL in hybrid net- 
tively). The quick mode time is nearly half (48.8% less) than 	 works. 
the handshake time for full version of DSSL (22.465 sec- 	 While the foregoing written description of the inventions 
onds), and is 38.8% less than that of SSL (18.61 seconds). 	 enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use what 
The optimizations in DSSL two-phase or DSSL quick 15 is considered presently to be the preferred implementations 
mode are proposed to overcome the detrimental effect of the 	 and best mode, those of ordinary skill will understand and 
long propagation delay of the satellite channel on the DSSL 	 appreciate the existence of variations, combinations, and 
handshake protocol. This optimization however requires fur- 	 equivalents of the specific implementation methods, and 
ther changes to the HTTP protocol, to allow piggy-backing 	 examples described herein. The inventions should therefore 
the DSSL secondary keys on the initial HTTP exchanges 20 not be limited by the above described implementations, 
between the client, the web server and the proxy server. FIG. 	 including methods, apparatuses, and examples, but by all 
8 compares the application response times for multiple secure 	 such implementations within the scope and spirit of the 
browsing sessions with multiple servers. The times for all 	 appended claims. 
cases of DSSL are much lower than that for SSL, and are 
comparable to unsecured web browsing. The additional delay 25 	 What is claimed: 
is primarily due to the security overhead at the different nodes 	 1. A computer implemented method for securing end-to- 
to maintain the secure session and to encrypt/decrypt the 	 end communication in hybrid satellite networks, comprising: 
traffic. 	 establishing, by a client node, a connection with a server 
Two solutions to the IPSEC problem have been proposed in 	 node in a hybrid satellite network, wherein a first proxy 
the prior art. The first approach is to move the TCP PEP 30 	 node is associated with the client node and a second 
gateways to the endpoints. The TCP optimizations are done 	 proxy node is associated with the server node; 
on the traffic in the clear, and then the traffic is encrypted 	 sending, by the client node and to the server node, a first 
using IPSEC. This approach improves the performance, but 	 certificate corresponding to the first proxy node during 
when a packet is lost or received in error, TCP goes into 	 Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol message 
congestion avoidance phase and the transmission is reduced 35 	 exchange for dynamic establishment of session keys for 
in half. The second approach is to split the secure connection 	 use in subsequent Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) 
into two at the satellite gateway. This allows the gateway to 	 encryption; 
decrypt the IPSEC packet and read the headers and thereby do 	 receiving, at the client node and from the server node, a 
performance optimizations. However, this requires trust in 	 second certificate corresponding to the second proxy 
the satellite gateway and might be unacceptable to users who 40 	 node during the IKE protocol message exchange; 
require strong end-to-end security. 	 obtaining, by the client node and based upon exchanging 
Several modified TCP protocols have also been proposed 	 the first certificate and the second certificate with the 
that perform better compared to the original specification in 	 server node, an additional pair of keys for encryption and 
the event of channel errors or delay, or when IPSEC is used. 	 authentication of messages using the first and second 
See, E. Olechna, P. Feighery, and S. Hryckiewicz, "Virtual 45 	 proxy nodes during the subsequent IPSEC encryption, 
private network issues using satellite based networks," in 	 wherein the additional pair of keys are obtained in addi- 
Military Communications Conference (MILCOM) 2001, vol. 	 tion to four primary keys generated during IKE protocol 
2, 2001, pp. 785-789. 	 message exchange for encryption and authentication by 
The problem of HTTP proxy performance with SSL has 	 the client and server nodes during the subsequent IPSEC 
been addressed by the industry by breaking up the end-to-end 50 	 encryption; and 
single SSL connection between client and server into mul- 	 distributing, by the client node, the additional pair of keys 
tiple SSL connections. In this solution, the client browser 	 to the first proxy node during the IKE protocol message 
creates a secure HTTP connection with the Remote Page 	 exchange. 
Accelerator (RPA) at the client satellite terminal, a second 	 2. The computer implemented method according to claim 
connection is created between the RPA and the Hub Page 55 1, comprising: 
Accelerator (HPA), and a third connection is between the 	 receiving, at the server node and from the client node, the 
HPA and the server. The RPA performs all necessary hand- 	 first certificate corresponding to the first proxy node 
shakingwiththe client browser. The HPA can decrypt the SSL 
	
during the IKE protocol message exchange; 
traffic from the server and perform the desired object pre- 	 sending, by the server node and to the client node, the 
fetching. The major drawback of this scheme is that it requires 60 	 second certificate corresponding to the second proxy 
a high level of trust in the intermediate nodes, which might be 	 node in response to receiving the first certificate; 
unacceptable when absolute end-to-end security is desired. 	 obtaining, by the server node and based upon exchanging 
The DSSL concept is partly similarto the multiple-channel 	 the first certificate and the second certificate with the 
SSL concept. However, there is no encryption differentiation 	 client node, the additional pair of keys for encryption 
for primary and secondary SSL records it is suggested that 65 	 and authentication of messages using the first and sec- 
HTTP traffic with lower security requirements be encrypted 	 ond proxy nodes during the subsequent IPSEC encryp- 
entirely with keys known to intermediate nodes. For security 	 tion; and 
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distributing, by the server node, the additional pair of keys 
to the second proxy node during the IKE protocol mes-
sage exchange. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the subsequent IPSEC 
encryption is operable to encrypt Internet Protocol (IP) pack-
ets that are exchanged between the client and server nodes, 
and 
wherein the four primary keys are used for encryption and 
authentication of a Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP) payload included in the IP packet, while the addi-
tional pair of keys are used for encryption and authenti-
cation of an IP header and a TCP header included in the 
IP packet. 
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the first and second 
proxy nodes are operable to decrypt and authenticate the IP 
and TCP headers included in the IP packet using the addi-
tional pair of keys. 
5. The method of claim 3, wherein the client and server 
nodes are operable to decrypt and authenticate the TCP pay-
load included in the IP packet using the four primary keys. 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein sending the first certifi- 
cate by the client node and to the server node comprises: 
sending, by the client node and to the server node, the first 
certificate corresponding to the first proxy node during a 
first phase of the IKE protocol message exchange; and 
receiving, at the client node and from the server node, the 
second certificate corresponding to the second proxy 
node during the first phase of the IKE protocol message 
exchange. 
7. The method of claim 6, wherein obtaining the additional 
pair of keys by the client node comprises: 
obtaining, by the client node and based upon exchanging 
the first certificate and the second certificate with the 
server node during the first phase of the IKE protocol 
message exchange, the additional pair of keys during a 
second phase of the IKE protocol message exchange, 
wherein the four primary keys are generated during the 
second phase of the IKE protocol message exchange; 
and 
distributing, by the client node, the additional pair of keys 
to the first proxy node during the second phase of the 
IKE protocol message exchange. 
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the first phase of the IKE 
protocol message exchange includes an aggressive mode of 
the IKE protocol message exchange, and wherein the second 
phase of the IKE protocol message exchange includes a quick 
mode of the IKE protocol message exchange. 
9. A computer implemented method for securing end-to- 
end communication in hybrid satellite networks, comprising: 
establishing, by a client node, a first connection with a 
HTTP proxy node in a hybrid satellite network, wherein 
a HTTP proxy node is associated with a server node; 
sending, by the client node and to the HTTP proxy node, a 
first certificate corresponding to the client node; 
receiving, at the client node and from the HTTP proxy 
node, a second certificate corresponding to the client 
node, wherein the second certificate is received at the 
client node in response to sending the first certificate; 
obtaining, by the client node, a public key associated with 
the HTTP proxy node from the second certificate; 
establishing, by the client node, a Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) connection with the server node; 
sending by the client node and to the server node, the first 
certificate corresponding to the client node and the sec-
ond certificate corresponding to the HTTP proxy node 
during a handshake phase of the SSL connection; 
10 
generating, by the client node, primary and secondary keys 
during the handshake phase of the SSL connection, 
wherein the primary key is used for encrypting HTML 
pages included in IP packets during data exchange using 
5 	 the SSL connection and the secondary key is used for 
encrypting object links included in the IP packets; 
sending, by the client node, the primary and secondary 
keys to the server node during the handshake phase of 
the SSL connection; and 
10 	 sending, by the client node and to the HTTP proxy node, 
instructions to obtain keys for the SSL connection from 
the server node. 
10. The method of claim 3, comprising: 
establishing, by the HTTP proxy node and based upon 
15 	 receiving instructions from the client node, a second 
connection with the server node; 
sending, by the HTTP proxy node and to the server node, 
the second certificate corresponding to the HTTP proxy 
node; 
20 receiving, at the HTTP proxy node, the secondary key from 
the server node; and 
sending, by the HTTP proxy node and to the client node, a 
confirmation indicating receipt of the secondary key 
from the server node. 
25 	 11. The method of claim 10, comprising: 
receiving, at the server node and during data exchange 
using the SSL connection, a secure HTTP (HTTPS) 
request from the client node; 
retrieving, by the server node, a requested HTML page in 
30 	 response to the HTTPS request; 
extracting, by the server node, embedded object links from 
the requested HTML page; 
generating, by the server node, a new HTML page includ-
ing the extracted object links; 
35 	 generating, by the server node, a first SSL record by 
encrypting the requested HTML page using the primary 
key, and a second SSL record by encrypting the new 
HTML page using the secondary key; and 
sending, by the server node and to the client node, an IP 
40 	 packet including the first recordandthe secondrecord as 
a response to the HTTPS request. 
12. The method of claim 11, comprising: 
receiving, at the HTTP proxy node, the IP packet sent by 
the server node to the client node; 
45 decrypting, by the HTTP proxy node, the second SSL 
record using the secondary key; 
obtaining, by the HTTP proxy node, the object links 
included in the second SSL record; 
sending, by the HTTP proxy node and to the server node, 
50 	 requests to pre-fetch the objects corresponding to the 
object links included in the second SSL record; 
receiving, at the HTTP proxy node and from the server 
node, the objects corresponding to the object links 
included in the second SSL record based on sending the 
55 	 requests to pre-fetch the objects; and 
forwarding, by the HTTP proxy node and to the client 
node, the objects corresponding to the object links 
included in the second SSL record that are received from 
the server node based on sending the requests to pre- 
60 	 fetch the objects. 
13. The method of claim 11, comprising: 
receiving, at the client node, the IP packet sent by the server 
node; 
decrypting, by the client node, the first SSL record using 
65 	 the primary key; and 
obtaining, by the client node, the requested HTML page 
included in the first SSL record. 
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14. A computer implemented method for securing end-to- 
end communication in hybrid satellite networks, comprising: 
generating, by a client node during an Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE) protocol message exchange with a 
server node in a hybrid satellite network for dynamic 
establishment of session keys for use in subsequent 
Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) encryption, four first 
IPSEC keys for encryption and authentication by the 
client and server nodes during the subsequent IPSEC 
encryption and a pair of second IPSEC keys for encryp-
tion and authentication of messages using a first proxy 
node and a second proxy node during the subsequent 
IPSEC encryption, wherein the first proxy node is asso-
ciated with the client node and the second proxy node is 
associated with the server node; 
distributing, by the client node, the pair of second IPSEC 
keys to the first proxy node during the IKE protocol 
message exchange; 
generating, by the client node, first and second SSL keys 
during a handshake phase of a Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) connection with the server node, wherein the first 
SSL key is used for encrypting HTML pages included in 
IP packets during data exchange using the SSL connec-
tion and the second SSL key is used for encrypting 
object links included in the IP packets; 
sending, by the client node, the first and second SSL keys 
to the server node during the handshake phase of the SSL 
connection; and 
sending instructions, by the client node and to an HTTP 
proxy node, to obtain keys for the SSL connection from 
the server node, wherein the HTTP proxy node is asso-
ciated with the server node. 
15. The computer implemented method according to claim 
14, wherein generating by the client node the four first IPSEC 
keys and the pair of second IPSEC keys during the IKE 
protocol message exchange with the server node comprises: 
establishing, by the client node, a connection with the 
server node; 
sending, by the client node and to the server node, a first 
certificate corresponding to the first proxy node during 
the IKE protocol message exchange; 
receiving, at the client node and from the server node, a 
second certificate corresponding to the second proxy 
node during the IKE protocol message exchange; and 
obtaining, by the client node and based upon exchanging 
the first certificate and the second certificate with the 
server node, the pair of second IPSEC keys. 
16. The method of claim 15, comprising: 
receiving, at the server node and from the client node, the 
first certificate corresponding to the first proxy node 
during the IKE protocol message exchange; 
sending, by the server node and to the client node, the 
second certificate corresponding to the second proxy 
node in response to receiving the first certificate; 
obtaining, by the server node and based upon exchanging 
the first certificate and the second certificate with the 
client node, the pair of second IPSEC keys; and 
distributing, by the server node, the pair of second IPSEC 
keys to the second proxy node during the IKE protocol 
message exchange. 
17. The method of claim 14, wherein generating by the 
client node the first and second SSL keys during the hand-
shake phase of the SSL connection with the server node 
comprises: 
establishing, by the client node, a first connection with the 
HTTP proxy node; 
12 
sending, by the client node and to the HTTP proxy node, a 
first certificate corresponding to the client node; 
receiving, at the client node and from the HTTP proxy 
node, a second certificate corresponding to the client 
5 	 node, wherein the second certificate is received at the 
client node in response to sending the first certificate; 
obtaining, by the client node, a public key associated with 
the HTTP proxy node from the second certificate; 
establishing, by the client node, the SSL connection with 
10 	 the server node; 
sending, by the client node and to the server node, the first 
certificate corresponding to the client node and the sec-
ond certificate corresponding to the HTTP proxy node 
15 	 during the handshake phase of the SSL connection; and 
generating, by the client node, the first and second SSL 
keys during the handshake phase of the SSL connection. 
18. The method of claim 17, comprising: 
establishing, by the HTTP proxy node and based upon 
20 	 receiving instructions from the client node, a second 
connection with the server node; 
sending, by the HTTP proxy node and to the server node, 
the second certificate corresponding to the HTTP proxy 
node; 
25 receiving, at the HTTP proxy node, the second SSL key 
from the server node; and 
sending, by the HTTP proxy node and to the client node, a 
confirmation indicating receipt of the second SSL key 
from the server node. 
30 	 19. The method of claim 18, comprising: 
receiving, at the server node and during data exchange 
using the SSL connection, a secure HTTP (HTTPS) 
request from the client node; 
retrieving, by the server node, a requested HTML page in 
35 	 response to the HTTPS request; 
extracting, by the server node, embedded object links from 
the requested HTML page; 
generating, by the server node, a new HTML page includ-
ing the extracted object links; 
40 	 generating, by the server node, a first SSL record by 
encrypting the requested HTML page using the first SSL 
key, and a second SSL record by encrypting the new 
HTML page using the second SSL key; and 
sending, by the server node and to the client node, an IP 
45 	 packet including the first recordandthe secondrecord as 
a response to the HTTPS request. 
20. The method of claim 19, comprising: 
receiving, at the HTTP proxy node, the IP packet sent by 
the server node to the client node; 
50 decrypting, by the HTTP proxy node, the second SSL 
record using the second SSL key; 
obtaining, by the HTTP proxy node, the object links 
included in the second SSL record; 
sending, by the HTTP proxy node and to the server node, 
55 	 requests to pre-fetch the objects corresponding to the 
object links included in the second SSL record; 
receiving, at the HTTP proxy node and from the server 
node, the objects corresponding to the object links 
included in the second SSL record based on sending the 
60 	 requests to pre-fetch the objects; and 
forwarding, by the HTTP proxy node and to the client 
node, the objects corresponding to the object links 
included in the second SSL record that are received from 
the server node based on sending the requests to pre- 
65 	 fetch the objects. 
